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ABSTRACT 
We consider a sequential equilibrium model over two periods, during the first of which agents have perfect 
information and their expectations are formed as if there were complete future markets. We show that, in the 
second period, equilibrium prices may well be different from those expected, without any unexpected change 
having occurred. This result highlights a lack of correspondence between the perfect foresight hypothesis and 
that of complete markets. 
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I. STRICTURES ON THE DOUBLE INTERPRETATION OF ARROW-DEBREU’S THEORY 
 
Economists unanimously recognise that current economic decisions are widely affected by 
expectations, among which those about the prices of commodities delivered in the future have 
certainly to be included. There are, however, three main different ways to treat these prices, with 
different related notions of equilibrium: i) focusing on normal levels around which the prices are 
                                                
*
 Address for correspondence: 
Saverio M. Fratini 
Università degli Studi Roma Tre 
Department of Economics 
via S. D’Amico, 77 
00145 Roma 
e-mail: fratini@uniroma3.it 
 2 
expected to fluctuate; ii) trying to guess expected future prices date by date; iii) assuming complete 
future markets and determining current and future prices simultaneously. 
Within the modern versions of the general equilibrium theory only the second and third way 
of treating expected prices are considered. In particular, following the last one, we have the 
intertemporal equilibrium, which is usually recognised to be analytically rigorous but completely 
detached from reality. In fact, as was admitted by Debreu himself (1959: 33), “[o]rganized futures 
markets concern only a small number of goods, locations and dates”, since, as already maintained 
by Hicks (1939: 137), agents know that “they cannot foretell at all exactly what quantities they will 
themselves desire to buy or sell at a future period” - or, as Bliss later wrote (1975: 56), “the 
supposition that everything that concerns an actor is known with certainty by him is, as far as a 
description of the world is concerned, not an abstraction but a fantasy”.  
Following the second way we have instead the temporary equilibrium, in which the markets 
are organized sequentially and at each date, current prices and outputs are determined taking 
expected future prices as givens, beside of current endowments, preferences and technological 
possibilities. Here agents have only beliefs about the primitives of the economy (Grandmont: 1970 
and 1977; Green, 1973): consequently, incorrect and uncommon expectations about future prices 
can arise, and with them temporally inconsistent production and consumption plans. 
Precisely the weaknesses of temporary equilibrium – such as its need for some extra-
assumptions in terms of borrowing constraints and default rules to demonstrate the existence of 
equilibrium, or its ad hoc specification of beliefs about future prices – have given nourishment to 
the former but unrealistic idea of a complete system of forward markets. More precisely, it has been 
maintained that the Arrow-Debreu’s complete markets hypothesis could be reinterpreted by 
considering an economy with only a limited number of futures markets but at least a commodity 
which can be used for loans between every couple of dates. For this case, because of their 
incompleteness, markets must reopen at each date for spot transactions and for the loans, but the 
assumption of agents’ perfect foresight is considered as a ‘perfect substitute’ for that of complete 
markets (Arrow, 1963; Radner, 1968 and 1972). 
The transition to the sequential markets model with perfect foresight has not however been 
without cost, since more stringent informational requirements concerning the participants of the 
economy must be included in them. In particular, while within the standard Arrow-Debreu 
framework each agent is assumed to know its own position (endowments, preferences and 
technological possibilities) but takes prices as exogenous parameters, here each agent is assumed to 
have a knowledge either about the positions of all the other ones, or directly about the prices that 
will rule in the future. Otherwise there would be no guarantee of identical and correct beliefs 
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regarding the spot prices which will prevail at each date and in each state. As Bliss (1975: 44, 48) 
pointed out, the hypothesis of perfect foresight puts an impossible strain upon the assumption of 
perfect knowledge and “it would be exactly as if there were forward markets”. Not surprisingly, it is 
often introduced only as a tool for indicative planning, or for the description of a stationary state, or 
to shape the distance between an ideal situation and one in which people make mistakes. 
These strictures on the notions of temporary and intertemporal equilibrium might have been 
avoided if the theory had followed the first of the ways listed above from the beginning. It 
corresponds to that normal position or equilibrium we find not only within the analysis of classical 
economists but also of Walras, Marshall or Wicksell, that is within the initial version of neoclassical 
theory. In such a normal position, prices the theory refers to are persistent, in the sense that they are 
consistent with a uniform rate of return on the supply prices of capital goods and the data at their 
basis change slowly enough (relative to the tendency to equilibrium values) to be able to be at least 
approximately considered as invariants1. Within this framework, it is indeed possible to assume that 
expectations are not realized perfectly and that equilibrium values emerge on average from the 
compensation of errors over time. In other words, it is possible to assume that agents have time to 
grasp and learn the long-period trend, so that no ad hoc hypotheses concerning future changes, 
unanimity of expectations on equilibrium quantities and prices, perfect knowledge of future tastes, 
endowments, and technology need to be introduced into the theory. 
Usually these problems are not discussed in depth in recent literature on general equilibrium, 
where these normal positions are wrongly identified with the stationary states2 (see Garegnani, 
1976). On the contrary, the question of how each agent can have the same catalogue of spot 
commodity prices, together with the extension of sequential equilibrium to an infinite time horizon, 
has merely further broadened the notions of equilibrium. Moreover, in general no doubt has been 
cast on the equivalence between the perfect foresight hypothesis and complete markets (see for 
instance Grandmont 1977: 535; Lucas, 1978; Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995: 743-744). 
According to us this is clearly unsatisfactory. In particular, here we will resume a sequential 
indeterminacy argument – similar to that in Mandler (1995) and (1999), but simplified and adapted 
to our aims – in order to show that future prices expectations, which are formulated by the agents as 
if they were in an Arrow-Debreu model, will generally prove incorrect. This result negates the 
attempt to justify the heroic assumption of the completeness of markets by arguing its equivalence 
to that of agents having complete information and making no systematic forecast errors about future 
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prices. It arises not from unpredictable accidents, but from the fact that expectations formed on the 
grounds of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium system can capture only one of the infinite configurations 
which prices can assume in the second-period equilibrium of a sequential model over two periods.  
 
 
II. THE COMPLETE MARKETS MODEL 
 
We consider an intertemporal equilibrium model over two periods. In each period the following 
commodities are delivered: m purely consumption goods; n purely (circulating) capital goods; 
labour. 
We denote by: ]p,...,p[p t,mt,1t =  the price vector of consumption goods delivered in period 
t, with t = 1, 2. Similarly, ]q,...,q[q t,nt,1t =  is the price vector of capital goods delivered in period 
t.3 The wage rate in period t is tw . All these prices are actual values. 
With reference to the consumption side, we assume each household h to have intertemporal 
endowments consisting of: capital goods available at the beginning of period 1, in quantities 
nh R
1
∈ω ; labour in period 1, in quantity h
1
λ ; labour in period 2, in quantity h
2
λ . For every possible 
price system, the household determines its consumption plan, m2hh R)x,x(
21
∈ , by maximizing its 
intertemporal utility function – which is assumed to be continuous, differentiable at least twice and 
concave on m2R  – subject to its intertemporal budget constraints: 
h
22
h
11
h
2
h
1
h
11 xpxpwwq 21 ⋅′+⋅′=λ+λ+ω⋅′ . In this way we get the functions of demand for 
consumption goods (.)x h
1
 and (.)x h
2
 whose properties are well-known. 
By aggregating demands and supplies among households we get: = h
h
tt (.)x(.)x ; 
 ω=ω h
h
1 1 ;  λ=λ h
h
t t
, with t = 1, 2. 
As for the production side, we assume linear activities, absence of joint production and 
absence of alternative methods. In particular we denote by A the n×m matrix having as columns the 
input coefficients of the n capital goods in the production of the m consumption goods; while 

a  is 
the row vector of the input coefficients of labour in the m activities. Similarly, B and 

b  are, 
respectively, the n×n matrix of capital good coefficients and labour coefficients in the production of 
the n capital goods. The non-negative vector mt Ry +∈  represents the quantities produced of 
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consumption goods delivered in period t, with t = 1, 2, while the non-negative vector nc Ry +∈  
represents the quantities produced of capital goods delivered in period 2. We also assume a free 
disposal activity for each capital good initially available and denote by jf  the quantity of the j-th 
capital good sent to the free disposal. 
 
Definition 1: given: a vector of endowments 2n211 R),,( +++∈λλω , a couple of demand functions 
(.)x1  and (.)x 2  with the customary prosperities, a n+1×m matrix of technical coefficients 




=

a
AA~  and a n+1×n matrix of technical coefficients 



=

b
BB~ ; then 
}B~,A~(.),x(.),x,,,{ 21211 λλω  is an element of the set of economies E. 
 
Definition 2: a system of prices }w,q,p,w,q,p{ 222111  and a system of quantities }y,y,y{ 2c1  are 
an intertemporal equilibrium for the economy E}B~,A~(.),x(.),x,,,{ 21211 ∈λλω  if and only if they 
satisfy the following conditions:4 
 
(1) tt y(.)x =   for t = 1, 2 
(2) fByAy c11 ++=ω  with 0fq j1,j =⋅  and 0f j ≥   for j = 1, ..., n. 
(3) 2c Ayy =  
(4) c11 ybya ⋅+⋅≥λ   with “=” if 0w1 >  
(5) 22 ya ⋅≥λ    with “=” if 0w 2 >  
(6) 

awAqp ttt +′≤′  for t = 1, 2 
(7) 

bwBqq 112 +′≤′  
(8) 1p
m
1i
2,i =
=
 
 
It is a well-known result that the system has at least one solution for every economy in E. Moreover, 
almost every economy in E has a finite number of equilibria (cf. Mas-Colell 1975). We may also 
conceive the possibility of economies with one and only one equilibrium. 
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Let EEˆ ⊂  be the set of economies for which the system (1)-(8) has only one solution; we 
can easily assume Eˆ  to be non empty. Besides, even if this is not necessary, we simplify our 
argument by concentrating the attention on economies which are elements of Eˆ . 
 
 
III. INCOMPLETE MARKETS MODEL. 
 
We now consider a model which is identical to the former, but with markets organised sequentially. 
There are the same commodities; the same individuals; firms have the same technology. We simply 
remove the complete market hypothesis. In particular, we assume that at the beginnings of period 1 
agents cannot trade the commodities delivered in period 2. 
As a consequence, at the beginning of period 2 markets will reopen in order to allow agents 
to trade the commodities delivered in that period. In particular, firms will hire from individuals 
capital goods and labour to be employed in period 2 by giving in exchange period 2 consumption 
goods. The equilibrium relative prices of those commodities will actually be determined only at the 
beginning of period 2; while at the beginning of period 1 – i.e., at the time agents have to take their 
decision concerning the first period – these prices are only expected prices. 
In accordance with the supposed possibility of the dual interpretation of the same formal 
model, we assume that the expected prices of commodities delivered in 2 are determined 
simultaneously with the prices of commodities delivered in period 1 by a system of equilibrium 
conditions which is identical to the system (1)-(8). 
 
Definition 3: a system of prices }w,q,p,w,q,p{ eee111 222  and a system of quantities }y,y,y{ ec1 2  are 
a first-period equilibrium for the economy S}B~,A~(.),x(.),x,,,{ 21211 ∈λλω  if and only if they 
satisfy the following conditions: 
 
(9) 11 y(.)x =  
(10) e2 2y(.)x =  
(11) fByAy c11 ++=ω  with 0fq j1,j =⋅  and 0f j ≥   for j = 1, ..., n. 
(12) ec 2Ayy =  
(13) c11 ybya ⋅+⋅≥λ   with “=” if 0w1 >  
(14) e2 2ya ⋅≥λ    with “=” if 0w
e
2
>
 
(15) 

awAqp 111 +′≤′  
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(16) 

awAqp eee
222
+
′
≤
′
 
(17) 

bwBqq 11
e
2
+′≤
′
 
(18) 1p
m
1i
e
2,i
=
=
 
 
Since we are concentrating our attention on economies which are elements of Eˆ , then the system 
(9)-(18) – which is formally equivalent to the system (1)-(8) – has a unique solution. Let us denote 
the solution by }wˆ,qˆ,pˆ,wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{ eee111 222  and }yˆ,yˆ,yˆ{
e
c1 2 . 
Having determined the quantities cyˆ  of capital goods produced during the first period, the 
endowments of capital goods in the second period will be 2ω , with c2 yˆ=ω . Therefore, the 
endowment of the second-period economy will be 1n22 R),( +++∈λω . 
Having determined the prices 1pˆ , 1qˆ  and 1wˆ , the demand function for the consumption 
goods delivered in period 2 will be: )w,q,p(xˆ)w,q,p,wˆ,qˆ,pˆ(x 22222221112 = . The continuity and 
the differentiability immediately extend from (.)x 2  to (.)xˆ 2 . As for Walras’ law, it can easily be 
proved that if 11 yˆ(.)x =  and c2 yˆ=ω  then 22222 wq(.)xˆp λ+ω⋅′=⋅′ . 
 
Definition 4: given a vector of endowments 1n22 R),( +++∈λω , a demand function (.)xˆ 2  with the 
customary prosperities and a n+1×m matrix of technical coefficients 



=

a
AA~ , then 
}A~(.),xˆ,,{ 222 λω  is an element of the set of second-period economies S. 
 
Definition 5: a system of prices }w,q,p{ 222  and a vector of quantities 2y  are a second-period 
equilibrium for the economy S}A~(.),xˆ,,{ 222 ∈λω  if and only if they satisfy the following 
conditions: 
 
(19) 22 y(.)xˆ =  
(20) dAy22 +=ω   with 0dq j2,j =⋅  and 0d j ≥   for j = 1, ..., n. 
(21) 22 ya ⋅≥λ    with “=” if 0w 2 >  
(22) 

awAqp 222 +′≤′  
(23) 1p
m
1i
2,i =
=
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Proposition 1: let }wˆ,qˆ,pˆ,wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{ eee111 222  and }yˆ,yˆ,yˆ{ ec1 2  be the unique solution of the system (9)-
(18), then }wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{}wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{ eee222 222=  and e2 2yˆyˆ =  is a solution of the system (19)-(23). 
Proof: let us posit 0d =  and seek a solution of the system (19)-(23), if one exists, under this 
hypothesis. Note that conditions (19)-(23), with 0d = , are identical to conditions (10), (12), (14), 
(16) and (18). Therefore, since }wˆ,qˆ,pˆ,wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{ eee111 222  and }yˆ,yˆ,yˆ{ ec1 2  solve the system (9)-(18), 
then the prices }wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{}wˆ,qˆ,pˆ{ eee222 222=  and the quantities e2 2yˆyˆ =  must solve the system (19)-
(23) with 0d =   
 
Proposition 2: Let us define the set P as follows: 
(24) }1p;yˆawyˆAqyˆp;yˆ(.)xˆ:w,q,p{P 2,ie2e2e2e2222 2222  =⋅+⋅′=⋅′==  . 
a) Every P}w,q,p{ 222 ∈  is a solution of the system (19)-(23) with e2 2yˆyˆ = . 
b) The set P is non-empty. 
c) If n > m, then the set P has infinite elements. 
Proof: 
a) Every P}w,q,p{ 222 ∈  satisfies, by definition, equilibrium conditions (19), (22) and (23). When 
e
2 2yˆyˆ =  and c2 yˆ=ω , condition (20) is satisfied too. Because of Walras’ law, conditions (19), 
(20), (22) and (23) imply condition (21). 
b) The proof follows from proposition 1. 
c) By definition, a vector }w,q,p{ 222  is an element of P if and only if it satisfies the following 
conditions: 
 
(25) 0yˆ(.)xˆ e2 2 =−  
(26) 0yˆ)awAqp( e222 2 =⋅−′−′   
(27)  =− 01p 2,j  
 
Let }w,q,p{ 222  be a solution of the system (25)-(27), we define a matrix M as follows: 
 
(28) 








′−′−=
00u
aAI
xˆD
M
2
  
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where 2xˆD  is the m×(m+n+1) Jacobian matrix at }w,q,p{ 222  of demand function for consumption 
goods delivered in period 2, I is the m×m identity matrix and u is an m-dimension row vector of 1s. 
As is well-known, }w,q,p{ 222  is a locally unique solution of the system (25)-(27) only if the 
matrix M is of column full rank. Therefore, since the matrix M has m+m+1 rows and m+n+1 
columns, if n > m then it cannot have column full rank  
 
Because of the continuity of equilibria of the second-period economy in the case where n > 
m, the unique system of expected prices, which were determined in the first period by an 
equilibrium system identical to that with complete markets, will consequently not be generically 
realized. In other words, expectations formed on the grounds of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium 
system can capture only one of the infinite configurations which prices can assume in the second-
period equilibrium of a sequential model over two periods. Consequently, no equivalence between 
the perfect foresight hypothesis and complete markets can correctly be advanced. 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Arrow, K.J. (1963) “Utility and Expectation in Economic Behavior”, in S. Koch (Ed.) Psychology: a Study 
of a Science, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Bliss, C.J. (1975) Capital Theory and the Distribution of Income, Amsterdam/New York: North-
Holland/Elsevier. 
 
Debreu, G. (1959) Theory of Value, New York: Wiley. 
 
Fratini, S.M. (2008) “Economic generality versus mathematical genericity: activity level indeterminacy and 
the index theorem in constant returns production economies”, Metroeconomica, vol. 59, pp. 266-275. 
 
Garegnani, P. (1976) “On a Change in the Notion of Equilibrium in Recent Work on Value and 
Distribution”, in M. Brown, K. Sato, P. Zaremka (Eds.) Essays in Modern Capital Theory, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Grandmont, J.M. (1977) “Temporary General Equilibrium Theory”, Econometrica, vol. 45, pp. 535-72. 
 
Green, J.R. (1973) “Temporary General Equilibrium in a Sequential Trading Model with Spot and Future 
Transactions”, Econometrica, vol. 41, pp.1103-23. 
 
Hicks, J.R. (1939) Value and Capital: An Inquiry into Some Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lucas, R. (1988) “On the Mechanics of Economic Development”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 22, 
pp. 3-42. 
 
Mandler, M. (1995) “Sequential indeterminacy in production economies”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 
66, pp. 406-436. 
 
Mandler, M. (1999) “Sraffian Indeterminacy in General Equilibrium”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, 
pp. 693-711 
 
 10 
Mas-Colell, A. (1975) “On the Continuity of Equilibrium Prices in Constant Returns Production 
Economies”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 2, pp. 21-33. 
 
Mas-Colell, A.; Whinston, M.D. and Green, J.R. (1995) Microeconomic Theory, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Radner, R. (1968) “Competitive Equilibrium Under Uncertainty”, Econometrica, vol. 36, pp. 31-58. 
 
Radner, R. (1972) “Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices and Price Expectations in a Sequence of 
Markets”, Econometrica, vol. 40, pp. 289-303. 
 
